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Introduction: Unemployment and Inflation in Europe
The late James Tobin classified Milton Friedman's 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association (Friedman 1968) as "… very likely the most influential article ever published in an economics journal. Its influence reached way beyond the profession -for example to European and Japanese central banks and to The Economist and other opinion leaders." (Tobin 1995: 40) Indeed, the "natural rate of unemployment hypothesis" (NRU) shifted the views on economic policy substantially and directed policy away from macroeconomics to the reform of institutional arrangements in order to change incentives and equilibrium unemployment. "The 'natural rate of unemployment,'
in other words, is the level of unemployment that would be ground out of the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided that there is imbedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets are imbedded in the model, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demand and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the cost of mobility, and so on." (Friedman 1968: 8) Friedman claimed that stagflation in the 1970s is clear evidence that monetary policy cannot be used to stimulate growth or to reduce unemployment. "Output is a real magnitude, not a monetary magnitude." (Friedman, 2006: 4) Thus, monetary policy is innocent, it does not affect growth and unemployment directly but only indirectly through its effects on expectations. In the words of Central Bankers: "Other than by maintaining price stability and thereby reaping its benefits in terms of economic performance there is no trade-off at longer horizons between inflation, on the one hand, and economic growth or employment, on the other hand, that can be exploited by monetary policy makers." (Issing 2000: 4) . This led to a broad consensus that the only appropriate objective of monetary policy is the maintenance of price stability, full stop. To reduce unemployment it would need structural reforms, was the economic policy message loudly trumpeted and heard.
However, Europe's unemployment trend (see Figures 1.1) is hardly consistent with one specific "natural rate of unemployment" since unemployment rose with every recession and remained at levels substantially above the pre-recession rates. "The only interpretation of this experience that is consistent with the accelerationist (the Friedman/ Phelps model, RS/ RS) model is that the neutral 2 rate of unemployment must have gone from around three percent to something of 10 percent in much of Europe, without doubt a bit higher in some countries and a bit lower in others. This rather remarkable hypothesis seems to have been accepted without a qualm." (Solow 1998: 9) Indeed, the analysis of European unemployment trends has been dominated by hypotheses claiming rising equilibrium unemployment (rising NAIRUs) caused by European labor market institutions, standing alone or in interaction with external shocks (Blanchard/ Wolfers 2000) . If monetary policy is included in the analysis at all, it is used as a "control" or only as a short-run disturbance (Nickell et al. 2005) very much in line with the neutrality of money hypothesis (see also Karanassou/ Sala/ Snower 2003 , 2007a , 2007b for a discussion).
The difference in welfare state arrangements in the US and Europe together with stable unemployment in the US and the upward trend in unemployment in Europe has been widely used as support for the deregulation of European labor markets and reductions of the welfare state program (see for a prototype paper : Siebert 1997 . Surprisingly little attention was given to macroeconomic institutions although substantial differences between the US and Europe exist here as well and which could have been used to investigate differences in labor market performance. Also the role of monetary policy changed substantially after 1973 when the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was substituted by flexible exchange rates. The impact of flexible exchange rates on trade, raising the risk for international transactions, has been widely recognized but very little attention has been given to the fundamentally different role that monetary policy has in a flexible exchange rate system compared to that in a fixed exchange rate system. The "interaction of shocks and institutions hypothesis" (Blanchard/ Wolfers 2000) argues that welfare state institutions slowed growth after the economy was hit by negative external shocks, leaving the economy having not fully recovered to the initial growth path. Thus, the economy remained with higher levels of unemployment. Surely this hypothesis fits the rise of European unemployment and the long-run decline in growth 3 Fitzenberger, Franz and Bode (2007) estimate NAIRUs for Germany using expected inflation but receive results not deviating substantially from simple averages Mean unemployment rate Fitzenberger/ Franz/ Bode estimates of NAIRUs 1970 NAIRUs -1981 NAIRUs 1.6 3.5 (1975 NAIRUs -1981 NAIRUs ) 1982 NAIRUs -1989 NAIRUs 6.0 6.0 1990 NAIRUs -1999 6. "Potential oriented" monetary policy will reduce the fluctuations around the trend but not the trend itself (as illustrated by the straight lines around the linear trend in Figure 1 .2).
Hence, potential oriented policy contributes to the stability of expectations, which can only be beneficial for the economy. How do we evaluate price stability if monetary policy is not neutral? Once one accepts real effects of monetary policy, as many recent studies suggest, a restrictive monetary policy will reduce growth and will not allow the economy to return to its initial growth path, especially if it is asymmetric, i.e., overly concerned with price stability and fears that expansionary periods create price pressure, but which puts only marginal attention to unused capacity. If, in addition, investment depends on expected growth as many studies evidenced (Carpenter et al. 1994 , Solow 2007 , an asymmetric monetary policy will also reduce investment and thus potential output. Hysteresis in labor markets may cause similar effects with respect to labor inputs 4 . Figure 1 .2 illustrates the impact of slow growth in upswings either caused by welfare state institutions (Blanchard/ Wolfers 2000) or asymmetric monetary policy. The most popular view of tight monetary policy under the (long-run) neutrality of money hypothesis is that the volatility is reduced but that the growth path is unaffected.
However, with asymmetric monetary policy the recoveries are slowed but recessions are not fully counteracted. We define asymmetric monetary policy as not (not fully) accommodating upswings and only reluctantly reacting to downswings. Asymmetric monetary policy in interaction with negative external shocks may be working in the following way: (1) a negative external shock pushes the economy into a recession which is not (fully) counteracted by monetary policy, (2) the upswing is not fully 6 accommodated because the central bank fears inflationary pressure, (3) as a result the economy will not swing back to the initial growth path but remains below, (4) with the next downswing the process will be reiterated, (5) in consequence asymmetric monetary policy will lower the long-run growth trend. All the ingredients needed to establish such a scenario are negative demand shocks and asymmetric policy reaction functions of central banks.
Figure 1.2: Business cycles and long-run growth trends
This paper first discusses the neutrality of monetary policy hypothesis and then analyzes the yardsticks for policy evaluations, potential output (growth) and "NAIRUs". We describe some important institutional changes, with respect to monetary policy in section four and analyze the asymmetry of the monetary policy of the Bundesbank in section 5.
The last section concludes.
g(GDP)
t Long run trend 7
Is Monetary Policy Neutral?
Can monetary policy affect the real variables, such as output and employment, by changing the rate of growth of the stock of money? It appears to be a consensus in the literature that monetary disturbance can have an impact on the course of the real economy in the short run, but in the long run, money is neutral and has effects only on prices (de Grauwe/ Costa Storti 2007 . There are no gains to be exploited from monetary expansion in the medium or long run (Issing 2000) . Theoretically, due to short-run wage or price rigidities, changes in the money supply might induce a short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. (See e.g., Fischer 1977 , Taylor 1980a , Rotemberg 1982 , Akerlof/ Yellen 1985 , Mankiw 1985 , Blanchard/ Kiyotaki 1987 . Alternatively, some economists explore another approach -real rigidities, to explain the nonneutralities of money (Solow 1985 , Ball/ Romer 1990 .
Applying vector autoregressions (VARs), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) Mankiw (2001: C48) classifies the finding of non-neutrality by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) "surprising", because the "the paper purports to provide evidence for the opposite conclusion -long-run monetary neutrality". Mankiw stresses the fact that standard errors rise with the time horizon and that therefore the estimated impact should become statistically insignificant if one looks out far enough. "But if one does not approach the data with a prior view favouring long-run neutrality, one would not leave the data with that posterior. The data's best guess is that monetary shocks leave permanent scars on the economy." (Mankiw 2001: C48) . How strong the belief in the neutrality assumption can affect the lead to a superficial empirics, may be demonstrated by Neumann's statement (Neumann 1998: 314/315 ) who regards the comparison of inflation rates and growth rates as sufficient evidence for the neutrality of money assertion. 6 Comparing the Swedish with US economy, they find unemployment effects to last a bit longer in Sweden, which is consistent with the view that unemployment adjustments are slower in more regulated labor markets (see Alexius/ Holmlund 2007) . De Grauwe and Costa Storti, however, do not find differences between the US and Europe with respect to the effects of monetary shocks on the real economy.
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and price stability, John Taylor (1980b) argues that contracting theories, i.e., contracts lasting for some period, predict a tradeoff between output and price stability. Whether the expectation channel or the contract channel is the dominating mechanism affects the persistence of inflation (Taylor 1979) . Hysteresis theories of unemployment, of course, predict long lasting effects even of otherwise short run impacts of monetary policy (see Ball 1997) . Romer and Romer (1994) does not hold for Germany 8 . We find a linear relationship also for Germany. In addition, the coefficient is much lower in Germany than in the US (see Table 2 .1). A lower coefficient for the deviation of actual from potential output in the regressions above means that prices react only weakly. However, given that the relationship seems to be linear, weak price reactions go in both directions, downward pressure is weak but so is upward pressure. A weak response to a negative gap is consistent with wages (prices) being inflexible downwards but wages (prices) in Germany are also inflexible upwards.
There are two sides of the "wage flexibility coin" as discussed in Bell and Freeman (1985) . We conclude that, at least for Germany, the constraints for monetary policy stemming from labor market rigidities as argued in Dolado et al. (2003) for the Euro area did not exist for the Bundesbank, which is consistent with the de Grauwe/ Costa Storti finding cited above (see also Schettkat 1992) . 
Neutral Output and NAIRUs
Whatever the wording -"natural employment", "full employment", "natural unemployment", "equilibrium unemployment", "neutral unemployment", "equilibrium output" "potential output", "natural growth" -it seems to be generally accepted among economists that resources may be overused and that this may create inflationary pressure.
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However, since the "potential" (to use a shortcut for the different wordings)
cannot be observed directly but needs to be estimated, the measurement (in a theoretical sense as well as with respect to econometric methods) is under debate
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. When do economies depart from the natural rate of unemployment (from full employment)?
The late James Tobin (1995: 33) emphasizes that for Friedman and Lucas the departure from "full employment" describes an equilibrium (market clearing) which thus can be changed only through adjustments of the structures, i.e., the institutional framework.
Reducing unemployment requires a shift of the equilibrium. For Keynes and Keynesians, unemployment (deviations from full employment) is not the result of market clearing but on the contrary a non-clearing phenomenon 11 -a slow adjustment phenomenon. Take the extreme assumption that "markets are always cleared". Under this assumption the economy always operates at full employment and the "potential" can actually be observed because it is always equal to actual output. Introducing some stochastic disturbances but quick adjustments preserves the core of the story. Once slow adjustments are allowed for, it is less clear what "full employment" or "potential output" actually is. For sure, it is not always the observed output or employment, but more often economies will deviate from full employment. 9 In the economic policy debate, usually NAIRUs (or natural rates) and/or potential output are used as proxies for equilibrium. Which one is used is largely a matter of taste because both are close relatives although not identical twins. Blinder/ Reis (2005) , for example, analyze the Greenspan legend in terms of NAIRUs. 10 For an overview, see Horn/ Logeay/ Tober 2007. 11 Blinder and Solow (1973) point out, that under the assumption of equilibrium -as under the natural rate hypothesis -an expansionary policy would, of course, be a distortion. But equilibrium is assumed (Solow 2008) .
Robert Solow (1998) writes that he prefers to use the term "neutral" rate of unemployment for the special state of the economy where supply and demand balance in the economy, he hesitates to call it "equilibrium rate" because that wording begs the question of the underlying equilibrium mechanism. What may lead to changes of the "neutral" rate? "The usual suspects include the demographic composition of the labor force, exogenously caused increases in food and energy prices, similar impulses from import prices, imposition or removal of formal or informal price controls, and still others.
It takes more slack to keep inflation from accelerating when these external impulses are strong than when they are weak. The neutral rate might also respond to occasional welldefined changes in the environment of the labor market -like the scope, duration and generosity of unemployment insurance benefits; the strength and aggressiveness of trade unions; the presence or absence of restrictions on layoffs by employers -or to characteristics of product markets, like the intensity of international and domestic competition, thought this possibility is neglected." (Solow 1998: 6) Because natural rates and potential output cannot be observed but need to be estimated, the estimation procedure is crucial. Different methods have been used ranging from linear trends between two points in time, smoothing procedures of times series (filtering) to structural models. Simple trends seem inadequate but they provide actually estimates which are at least not totally out of range, especially if structural breaks in trends are allowed for. The pioneer of estimating potentials, Arthur Okun, used a simple linear trend between peaks to estimate potential output (see Okun 1970) . The simplicity of the method is an obvious advantage, but it requires the peaks to result from policies allowing the potential to develop. A bit more complicated but still very modest with respect to data requirements are so called filter techniques, such as the widely used Hodrick-Prescott filter or the Kalman filter. All what is needed is the data series itself.
Using the data series itself and decomposing it in a trend and other components or simply smoothing it, of course, assumes that actual values fluctuate around the potential (or that actual unemployment fluctuates around "neutral" unemployment). If only short term deviations from the "neutral" or potential level exist, this method is probably sufficient.
The method, however, does not allow for prolonged periods of capacity underutilization (which may be due to labor or capital underutilization). That distinguishes smoothing methods from structural estimates using aggregate or disaggregated production functions.
Therefore, the difference between methods is not only one of econometrics but fundamental: Smoothing of time series -filtering -assumes more or less quick adjustments if the economy deviates from the equilibrium whereas structural models are potentially immune against such a bias. Although theoretically preferable, structural models are facing data problems ranging from the availability of data to substantial measurement error and volatility of the data which often requires some smoothing of the series.
Differences between estimates of output potential are not only an academic debate, they influence but all areas of economic policy, monetary and fiscal policy as well as social, tax and labor market policies because they are at least one indicator directing policy paper also provides an impression of differences in the estimated output gap for different estimation methods, which are astonishingly big. The gap between different methods can be as big as 6%pts and the conclusions drawn from these differences can differ substantially. For example, in the mid 1980s some methods would suggest overutilization of capacity whereas others predict severe under-utilization. Or in practical terms: the upper bound estimates would make Central Bankers already nervous whereas the lower estimates will probably make them more relaxed. Astonishingly enough, the Bundesbank's estimates with the new (but also with the former) method suggest that the German economy was underutilizing its capacity over long periods. If the Bundesbank's re-estimation of the German production potential is close to the true potential, the recent economic history of Germany is characterized by an almost continuous underutilization of capacity (see Figure 3 .1). In 7 out of 30 years shown in Figure 3 .1 the German economy was operating above its potential and in 16
years underutilization was at least 1% or more. 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1
Also, the estimations of NAIRUs are suffering from great insecurity about the values.
Analyzing US NAIRUs, Staiger et al. (1997) conclude: "However, the most striking feature of theses estimates is their lack of precision. For example, the 95% confidence interval for the current value of the NAIRU based on the GDP deflator is 4.3% to 7.3%.
In fact, our 95% confidence intervals for the NAIRU are commonly so wide that the unemployment rate has only been below them for a few brief periods over the last 20
years." (Staiger et al. 1997: 34) . 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1990, 1991, 1992 the actual unemployment rate was roughly equal to the Kalman-NAIRU, i.e. in these years the unemployment gap displayed in Figure 3 .2 was about zero.
In all other years the unemployment is strongly positive implying that the potential for growth was severely underused in Germany. Thus, NAWRUs (the OECD's favorite for a long time) which followed the actual unemployment rate closely (see Figure 3. 2) seem to have severely overestimated structural unemployment in Germany or in other words, these estimates may have caused an unnecessarily cautious monetary policy.
13 The Okun gap describes the difference between the actual and the "natural" unemployment rate as a function of the deviation of actual from potential GDP. Alternatively, the Okun gap is also estimated as the difference in unemployment rates as a function of GDP growth rates. We estimate that 1% difference in the unemployment rate results in about 2.5% loss in GDP in Germany before 1989; 1% difference in the unemployment rate results in about 2.0% loss in GDP in the US before 1989.
Figure 3.2: Unemployment gaps (actual unemployment rate minus NAIRU) for previous OECD estimates (NAWRUs) and HP and Kalman filtered NAIRUs, Germany
Source: based on data in Richardson et al. (2000): 62.
In the 1990s almost all US economists believed that the US NAIRU was about 6.5% and thus a fall of actual unemployment below the NAIRU should have alarmed central bankers, first of all, the president of the FED, Alan Greenspan. However, as we know now the US unemployment rate could fall as far as 4% without accelerating inflation but we only know because the FED allowed the unemployment rate to fall below the level so many believed would lead to accelerating inflation. Greenspan, a data miner, (see also Greenspan, 2007) concluded that US productivity must have risen and that therefore the growth potential was higher than commonly assumed. The Greenspan NAIRU estimates must have been substantially lower than the common belief of the NAIRU level. Blinder and Reis (2005) argue that sophisticated econometricians (Blinder/ Reis refer to Staiger et al. 2001) were only years after the event able to trace the downward NAIRU-path Alan
Greenspan must have identified in the mid 1990s.
Therefore, we should probably be very cautious before applying restrictive policies, which are extremely costly. "I want to argue that there can be an economically meaningful margin of uncertainty of the whereabouts of the neutral rate at any particular time, and, even further, that it may not be the sort of stable parameter that the underlying theory needs it to be." (Solow 1998: 8) 
Changes of Monetary Policy Institutions
According to the Bundesbank Act from 1957, the Bundesbank's primary objective was Europe". Therefore, the establishment of the ECB was seen by many European countries as a measure to regain influence on monetary policy (Wyplosz 2007 (Wyplosz , 2008 .
The dominance of price stability has been carried over from the Bundesbank to the ECB and is in contrast to principles of the Federal Reserve System (FED). The FED has a "dual mandate" and is required to use monetary policy to achieve price stability, but also "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, and stable prices. with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." 15 For an early application of a loss function, see Fase/ den Butter 1977. 16 The quadratic terms imply that deviations from the target in both directions are equally important, which may be questionable especially for output (see Blinder 2006). attempt to specify the federal funds rate that will come closest to achieving the theoretically appropriate rate of monetary growth to achieve a constant rate of inflation.
On these lines, the inclusion of the deviations in output from a target rate is not justified by a secondary objective of the Fed. It is rather to be justified by in the inadequacy of inflationary deviations alone to generate the appropriate fluctuations in money." (Friedman 2006: 4/5) Shortly after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system freed central banks from binding exchange rates, the Bundesbank adopted a policy of targeting monetary aggregates. As Table 4 Applying a loss function to analyze the Bundesbank's policy we do not intend to argue that the Bundesbank applied an inflation-target rule in the strict sense, but we rather use it as an instrument to detect possible asymmetries in monetary policy. Clearly, the Bundesbank argued that it followed a median or long term strategy of price stability. 3.5 -6.5 6.4 1.5 -2.0 1.9 1998 3 -6 4.9 1.5 -2.0 0.9
Note: "Money" is central bank money at the 1974 reserve requirements for the period 1975 -87, West German M3 for 1988 -90, and German M3 since 1991 . From 1975 , the inflation targets are announced "unavoidable rate of price increase", and since 1986, are announced the rate of being consistent with "price stability".
Source: Bernanke and Mihov (1997) , Schächter (1999) , Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report (1997 . Clarida and Gertler (1997) be captured by a modified Taylor rule. One of the important findings they make is that the interest rate responds asymmetrically to the inflation gap (see section 5). As the target inflation rates in Table 4 .1 show, did the Bundesbank follow a more and more ambitious policy of very high price stability by establishing the later ECB target of less than 2% inflation in 1997.
Asymmetric Monetary Policy
Given the loss function as in equations 1a and 1b, the central bank may use its policy instrument, e.g., the short-run interest rate to minimize the deviation of the inflation and output from their targets respectively. In the light of this, John Taylor (1993) proposes a simple interest rate rule as a monetary policy rule:
where i is short-term interest rate, r* is the real equilibrium interest rate, π e is (expected) inflation rate and (y-y*) is the percentage deviation of the real output from its target. It says that the central bank should set the short-term interest rate in the consideration of variability of inflation and output.
Different from Clarida and Gertler's (1997) forward-looking specification, we use the Taylor's specification while allowing for interest rate smoothing by introducing two lags interest rate terms in the specification 17 , to demonstrate how the Bundesbank carried out monetary polices for the period of 1975 to 1998. By using the Taylor's specification, we assume that the Bundesbank made monetary policy decisions based on the historical and current data that were available. 17 Introducing two lags is sufficient to be able to reduce the serial correlation problem in the OLS residuals and it reflects the fact that central banks care about the financial market stability and thus hesitate to make overly abrupt changes in interest rates.
We run an OLS regression on the partial-adjustment monetary reaction function and get 18 for the period 1975 I to 1998 IV: 
where the adjusted R-squared is 0.94, S.E. = 0.56, and DW = 2.21, the coefficient before the Taylor shows that the Fed responded to both the inflation deviation and the output gaps more strongly than the Bundesbank did, which is consistent with a long-run policy orientation of the Bundesbank.
The Bundesbank hardly taking the output gaps into consideration concerning the policy making is plausible since the output fluctuations do not enter the objective function of the 18 The data sources are Bundesbank's Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook: West German data for [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] and German data for 1991-1998. Inflation, π, is calculated based on CPI. The implicit inflation targets by the Bundesbank are used as π*, as shown in Table 4 .1. The real GDP trend is created with the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with λ equal 1600). Then (y-y*) is calculated as percentage deviation of real GDP from its trend. 19 Taylor (1993) specifies a policy rule that fits the data pretty well for the United States for the period from 1987 to 1992: i = 5 + 1.5(π-2)+ 0.5(y-y*), where the inflation target is assumed to be 2 percent, i is the federal funds rate.
Bundesbank directly. However, output itself is a factor in determining inflation. Output fluctuations, esp. a large upside deviation of output from its trend, could power inflation pressure. Thus, the Bundebank might react asymmetrically to output fluctuations.
However, equation (3) 
for ( 
where the adjusted R-squared is 0.95, S.E. = 0.55, and DW = 2.12.
When actual output was above potential output, the Bundesbank acted precautious, deviating from the long orientation and raising the interest rate. When actual output was below potential output, the Bundesbank kept the long run orientation and did not lower the interest rate.
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The regression results support our hypothesis that the Bundesbank 20 The negative coefficient for (y-y*) is not significant in this regression. Otherwise it would indicate a procyclical monetary policy, i.e., rising interest rates when the production potential is underused. We find this coefficient to be significant when we use GMM rather OLS. Other considerations (like exchange rate stabilization or an underestimation of the potential (see Figures 3.1 and 3 .2) may justify that result, but otherwise a coefficient is difficult to rationalize. However, we believe that OLS can be used in our analysis because no regressor is correlated with the error term and multicollinearity is limited.
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responds to output gaps asymmetrically in different economic situations.
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When positive output gaps enhance the fear of higher inflation, the Bundesbank reacted strongly by raising the interest rate, as evidenced by the larger coefficients for both inflation deviation and output gap. Thus, the Bank slowed economic expansions. However, in contrast, when the output gap is negative, the Bundesbank does not reduce the interest rate significantly, i.e., it does not counter recessions. Yet, the overall feature of regression (3) and (4) is its good fit -the adjusted R squared is high, 0.94 and 0.95, respectively. Figure 5 .1 plots the actual interest rate, the fitted and the residuals from regression (5). The fitted follows the actual interest rate closely and the large part of residuals remain within the range of (-0.5, 0.5) standard deviations.
To investigate the impact of asymmetric monetary policy we display the cumulated growth rates in recoveries for Germany and the US in Table 5 .1. The data show roughly similar rates for the 1975 recession but in the following years cumulated growth rates for Germany are substantially lower than the US rates, which is probably most severe in the recovery of the early 1990s (the recession was later in Germany than in the US), i.e., in a situation where growth was most needed just after German unification. * A trough is defined as at least two consecutive quarters with negative growth in GDP.
**computed from the sum of log differences.
Source: Calculations are based on OECD Economic Outlook Database. quarters was as high as 24.5% in the 1982 recovery. Also private consumption grew at substantially higher rates in the US but with public consumption the picture is mixed.
Investment is the classical textbook case for the illustration of monetary policy effects but a non accommodating monetary policy may also dampen investment through the expected lower demand growth. Although the growth data in Table 5 .1 and 5.2 confirm the differences between the Bundesbank and FED, it nevertheless underestimates the restrictiveness of the Bundesbank policy because Germany operated on substantially higher productivity growth rates than the US until the mid 1990s, i.e., higher productivity growth in Germany should have allowed for higher GDP growth in Germany without the fear of inflationary pressure. Support for more expansionary monetary policy should have been stronger and to promote employment, Germany actually needed higher growth than the US in recoveries.
To return to the initial growth path and initial employment levels, GDP growth needs to be higher than productivity growth. The differences of the GPD growth rates and the productivity growth rates (both in log differences) are shown in Figure 5 .2 for 12 quarters after the trough for the 3 recoveries in Germany and the US. In every recovery, the US curve is clearly above the German curve and reaches substantial rates, which enabled the employment expansion in the US. In contrast, the German curve hardly moves above the line representing the zero difference. The cumulated difference of the GDP growth rate minus the productivity growth rates for 12 quarters after the trough was 0.4% for the 1975 recovery, 1.4% for the 1982 recovery and -0.6% for the 1993 recovery in Germany.
This is in stark contrast to the US values, which are 9.7% for the 1975 recovery, 8.1% for the 1982 recovery and 3.5% for the 1991 recovery.
Given theses figures, it does not come as a surprise that German unemployment remained at ever higher levels after each recession. There was clearly much more room for economic expansion in recoveries but it was slowed by overly restrictive asymmetric monetary policy as our regressions suggest.
The conclusion from Figure 5 .2 clearly is that a more dynamic economic recovery in Figure 5. 3).
Economic growth is the "deus ex machina" of unemployment if structural features do not prevent the employed to become unemployed. The German economy underwent structural changes at least as strong as the US economy and flow based analysis shows that the dynamics in the German labor market were high. In addition, duration analysis of unemployment and vacancies suggests that German unemployment was more a jobdeficit than a rigidity phenomenon (Schettkat 1992) . Cross country evidence causes doubt on the "institutional rigidity story" as well ( Note: Hypothetical changes are derived from growth gaps of Germany against the US applying Okun's law, i.e., every 2.5%pt GDP growth equals 1%pt unemployment, see footnote 13. Source: Computations are based on quarterly data from the OECD Economic Outlook database. For the definition of the business cycle periods, see Table 5 .1. 
Conclusions
This paper establishes evidence that the German economy was, with the exception of a few years, operating continuously below its potential since the early 1970s, which is in stark contrast to the US economy. In the US, growth rates were clearly higher after recessions, both in absolute terms and relative to the growth of the potential. We emphasized the measurement problems related to the estimation of potential output but the patterns seem to be very stable and different methods applied show consistent results:
Germany could have been more prosperous if the potential had been fully used.
Is the relative underperformance of the German economy related to monetary policy or did other variables cause the underperformance? We show that the Bundesbank applied an asymmetric interest reaction function, i.e., the bank emphasized price stability and thus reacted strongly to rising inflation -which is the basis of the widely celebrated
Bundesbank legend -and raised interest when potential output was reached or passed.
But the Bundesbank did not react as strongly when actual output was falling short of potential output. It is sufficient that monetary policy affects the real economy in the short run to establish the link between asymmetric monetary policy reaction and the growth path of the economy. If economic growth after a recession is dampened, the economy cannot return to the initial growth path and this way, the long-run growth trend will be reduced as well.
But could the Bundesbank have done better? Was it the over-commitment to price stability in the bank's objective function or was the information at the time when decisions had to be made, just not sufficient to draw different conclusions? This issue is discussed in the "real time" literature, where it is argued that the US inflation of the 1970s was the result of an overestimated potential because the productivity slowdown was not recognized at that time (Orphanides 2001) . Clearly, if the estimates of the potential are biased, policies based on these estimates may be biased, but the bias can go in both directions and although inflation may be harming the economy, so does underused capacity and unemployment (Hargreaves Heap 1980) . The decision probably which side one weights more has to be made. If one assumes neutrality or long-run neutrality of monetary policy, the decision is easily made: pushing for high price stability is not very costly. If however, monetary policy has not only short-run but even long-run effects -as endogenous investments or hysteresis processes suggest -overly emphasizing price stability is extremely costly for society as the Okun's law suggests.
Monetary policy is not the only macro policy and the Bundesbank may not be responsible Once path dependence is allowed for (through sorting, skill depreciation and other mechanisms) unemployment may be difficult to reduce after high unemployment has persisted for a certain period. This process, however, is not an argument against a more expansionary policy but it is in favor of it because inactivity will cause high, long-lasting costs (Stiglitz 1997) . A policy less constraining economic growth in recoveries could have brought German unemployment rates back to pre-recession levels and could have prevented the structuring of unemployment.
